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AN OVERVIEW OF WELFARE-
TO-WORK EFFORTS
REBECCA M. BLANK*
Over the past decade, there has been substantial
interest throughout Europe in the US policy changes
designed to move welfare recipients into employ-
ment. This paper summarizes some of the main re-
search and policy lessons from US welfare-to-work
programs, with particularly emphasis on those issues
of interest in a European context.
“Welfare” in the United States has primarily meant
cash payments to single mothers. Only about 10 per-
cent of the welfare caseload is married couples with
children, who face more stringent eligibility condi-
tions.This is in contrast to many European countries
where social assistance programs are typically avail-
able to singles and married couples,with and without
children. Hence, the US welfare-to-work policies
focused on moving low-skilled single mothers into
work and may not apply to persons in other living
situations. Single mothers form a significant (and
growing) population among welfare recipients in
almost all countries, however.
Welfare to work efforts in the United States
Because of the federalist structure of US govern-
ment, welfare programs have been the shared
responsibility of federal and state (and often county
or city) governments. State and local governments
have always had administrative responsibility for
operating these programs. Starting in the 1980s, the
federal government began to encourage states to
design programs that explicitly helped welfare recip-
ients enter the workforce. This culminated in the
1996 national welfare reform bill, which gave states
much greater discretion over designing welfare pro-
grams, but (somewhat contradictorily) increased the
requirements on states to run mandatory welfare-to-
work programs. Hence, US experience with welfare-
to-work comes not from centralized program efforts,
but from multiple state programs, each with its own
particular design.
States have encouraged work through both positive
work incentives and more punitive work mandates.
Few states made major cuts in benefit levels for non-
workers (although steady inflation erosion of welfare
benefits has lowered overall benefit levels in most
states over time). US benefit levels have always been
relatively low, however. In 2000, monthly benefits in
the median state for a non-working mother with two
children were at the level of what one would earn
working 17 hours/week at the minimum wage.
The measures that states have taken to encourage
work include the following:
• Mandatory welfare-to-work programs. As a con-
dition of benefit receipt, recipients who are
labeled “work-ready” are required to participate
in programs that focus on moving them into
employment. These are typically not education
and training programs, but are instead “work-
first” programs, aimed at getting women into jobs
as quickly as possible.The programs may include
training in job search and job retention, but are
often quite short-term (at the most 1–2 months)
and typically end with mandatory job search.
• Funding for child care assistance and other work
supports. As work requirements have grown, so
have the funds available to subsidize paid child
care for welfare recipients and welfare leavers.
States often provide assistance for other work-
related expenses, particularly transportation. In
addition, expansions in public health insurance
programs (available only to welfare recipients in
the past) have allowed a growing number of low-
income children and adults access to health insur-
ance even after their families leave welfare. The
adequacy of these child care and health expan-
sions is the subject of ongoing debate.
• Increased earnings disregards. Many states have
lowered the rate at which benefits decline as earn-
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efits at low levels of earnings.This acts as a subsidy
to low-wage work and increases the incentives to
enter work; in the past, earnings gains were often
offset almost dollar-for-dollar with benefit reduc-
tions for women trying to leave welfare.
• Time limits on welfare receipt. Since 1996, welfare
recipients are eligible for only 60 months of feder-
ally funded benefits throughout their adult lifetime
(states can excuse some recipients from this time
limit). Some states have enforced time limits quite
strictly, while others have provided state-funded
benefits for many women after they hit the federal
time-line. The threat of time limits has given case
managers a strong tool that they use to urge recip-
ients to avoid long-term reliance on welfare.
• Sanctions for recipients who do not comply with
welfare-to-work requirements. More women
appear to have lost eligibility for welfare benefits
because of sanctions rather than time limits.
Women who do not participate fully in the wel-
fare-to-work programs to which they are assigned
can lose their benefit eligibility. In some states
such losses can be permanent;in other states,sanc-
tions will result in only temporary benefit loss.
All of these policies increase the incentives for welfare
recipients to move into work. At the same time as
these changes were being implemented, the US also
expanded work incentives for low-wage workers in
two other ways. First, minimum wages rose 11 percent
in real (inflation-adjusted) terms between 1989 and
2000. Second, the federal government greatly expand-
ed wage subsidies to working families with children in
the federal tax system.The Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) offsets tax liabilities and (for those with no tax
liabilities) provides a subsidy to low-wage earners with
children in low-income families.
Because the EITC is run through
the tax system, it is conditioned
on both individual wages and
household earnings, making it a
very effective targeted program
that avoids subsidizing low-wage
earners in higher income house-
holds. Because individuals file
their own tax returns, employers
are not necessarily aware which
of their low-wage workers have
eligibility for the EITC. This
means that the EITC may avoid
some of the problems experi-
enced with wage subsidies, where employers capture
part of the subsidy by reducing their wage offers.The
US EITC has received a great deal of research and
policy attention. Details on its operation and design
are provided by Hoffman and Seidman (2003).
European interest in the EITC has been particularly
strong, and the British Working Families Tax Credit,
adopted in 1998 was modeled on the EITC.
Did behavior change?
The net effect of these welfare and wage policies has
been to increase exits from welfare programs and
reduce entry. Caseloads have fallen significantly,
while employment among less-skilled single mothers
has risen. Figure 1 shows the changes in the number
of welfare recipients in the US over the last 30 years.
By 2001, caseloads were at 40 percent of their level
in 1994. Furthermore, the mild recession and higher
unemployment rates in the early 2000s had almost
no effect on caseloads. Families did not return to
welfare, even when jobs became less scarce.
Figure 2 shows changes in labor force participation
among single mothers by skill level. The solid line
shows the increase in labor force participation
among the least skilled single mothers was greater
over the 1990s than among any other group. While
labor force participation fell slightly for less skilled
single mothers with the economic slowdown of the
early 2000s, it still remains well above where it was a
decade ago.
The Table shows the effects of these changes on the
income composition of single mother households.The
share of income from public assistance fell from 23 to
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4 percent between 1985 and 2002, while the share of
income from own earnings rose from 49 to 67 percent.
Overall, real incomes rose by more than $3,000.
A substantial body of research has investigated how
much of the change in welfare participation, in work
behavior, and in income is due to the changing wel-
fare and tax policies in the US that promoted work
for low income families, and particularly for welfare
recipients.This work is summarized in Blank (2002)
and Grogger and Karoly (2005). It suggests that the
policy changes of the 1990s were a significant factor
in the increases in labor market involvement, reduc-
tions in poverty, and reductions in caseloads. The
strong US economy of the 1990s was highly impor-
tant for these changes as well, allowing these policy
changes to be implemented at a time when unem-
ployment was low and jobs were readily available in
most areas of the country.But even when unemploy-
ment went up and economic growth slowed, case-
loads remained low, labor force participation
remained higher,and poverty rates of single mothers
remained well below where they
had been in the early 1990s.
This does not imply that the US
welfare-to-work efforts have been
an unqualified success. A variety
of troubling issues remains un-
solved.A growing number of sin-
gle mothers report neither receiv-
ing welfare nor working, and the
well-being of these families is a
particular concern. Women who
have hit time limits or sanctions
seem particularly likely to be in
this group and by most reports are
worse off following these changes.
Furthermore, although a large number of women
have left welfare for work, far fewer have actually
escaped poverty. More than a quarter of all single
mothers remain poor.
Lessons from the US experience
Drawing lessons from the US experience with wel-
fare-to-work efforts for those in other countries is a
difficult task given large cross-country differences in
economic and institutional structure, and in social
norms around income redistribution. Hence, the fol-
lowing comments must be read with skepticism.That
said, let me focus on five key policy lessons that I
draw from observing US efforts to move more wel-
fare recipients into work.
First, the dual emphasis in the US policy on both
positive work incentives and on more punitive work
mandates seems to have been important.Work man-
dates (mandatory welfare-to-work programs,backed
by sanctions and time limits) seem to have forced
more people into work faster than would have natu-
rally left welfare in a strong economic environment.
On the other hand, with low wages and (often) part-
time hours,many of these welfare leavers would gain
little in income without subsidies to low-wage work.
Reduced earnings disregards, the expanded EITC,
and subsidies to assist with child care or other work-
related expenses,all helped “make work pay”,to use
the phrase popularized by President Clinton in the
mid-1990s.
This conclusion is buttressed by several research
studies that have looked at various “financial incen-
tive” programs aimed at increasing employment
(summarized in Blank 2002 or Michalopolous and
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dollars) in percent of total income
1985 20,417 23.82 49.03 5.49 21.66
1990 18,412 22.63 53.32 4.15 19.90
1995 20,026 16.46 56.52 3.63 23.39
2000 23,654 5.27 68.77 4.19 21.77
2002 23,805 4.45 67.18 3.98 24.40
Note: Total income is the mean dollar value (in
2000 dollars) before taxes. Public assistance is com-
posed primarily of AFDC and TANF benefits.
These calculations are pre-tax and do not include
the inputed value of any in-kind benefits. 
 Source: Author’s tabulations of the March Current
 Population Survey.Berlin 2001). These suggest that work mandates
alone generate increased work but have limited
effect on poverty as increased earnings are offset by
lost benefits; wage subsidies increased income
among workers but did little to move a lot of addi-
tional people into work; only programs that com-
bined both subsidies and mandates had the desired
effect of both increasing work and reducing poverty.
My impression is that European welfare to work
efforts have generally focused more on positive work
incentives (wage subsidies), without the more puni-
tive aspects of mandatory work programs with time-
limited benefits. These programs might reduce eco-
nomic need among low-wage workers, but this
emphasis on positive work incentives alone may not
be enough to create substantial movement into work.
Second, simply getting women into jobs was not
enough; other work supports were very important
for the success of US welfare-to-work programs.The
abundant job environment of the mid-1990s in the
US made it relatively easy for many women to find
work. But the women who were most successful did
more than just find a job; these women were also
able to arrange stable child care, had access to trans-
portation that got them to where jobs were located,
and did not experience depression or other physical
or mental health problems.
In short, there are many barriers to work, and find-
ing a job solves only one of those barriers.Programs
that are serious about moving as many women as
possible into employment will help with the other
barriers as well, working with women on child care,
management of housing or transportation problems,
and assuring access to good medical care.Put anoth-
er way, countries with widespread public child care
(such as France) will find welfare-to-work efforts far
easier than countries without such support (such as
Germany), even in equivalent economic environ-
ments.
Third,the availability of low-skilled jobs is necessary
for an effective welfare-to-work effort.The US econ-
omy, with relatively low unemployment rates and
larger numbers of lower-wage jobs,provides a better
environment for welfare-to-work efforts than many
European countries. Hence, welfare reforms and
labor market reforms to create greater job growth
and job flexibility (particularly access to part-time
jobs) must go hand-in-hand.
A key question in the US is why caseloads did not
rise, even when unemployment rose and jobs
became less available. It is possible that the message
to “get off welfare”and the warnings about time lim-
its and sanctions were so strong that even women
who might have been able to return to welfare were
reluctant to do so when they lost their job in the
early 2000s. But the recession of 2001 in the US was
concentrated in manufacturing and traded goods
(sectors of the economy that employ a dispropor-
tionately large number of male workers) and in the
high-tech collapse (largely affecting more skilled
workers). Less-skilled women were concentrated in
the retail and service sector, and these sectors were
less affected.As a result, many welfare leavers were
probably able to hold onto their jobs. A deeper
recession, or an economic slowdown with greater
effects on the retail and service sector, might have
driven many more single mothers back to the wel-
fare office.
Fourth, the flexibility and variability of the US fed-
eralist system was important in making this welfare
reform both politically palatable and administrative-
ly do-able. While states were under mandate to in-
crease employment levels among welfare recipients,
they had no centralized directions for how to do this.
Furthermore, they had adequate funding to imple-
ment changes. (The block grant funding levels from
the federal government were fixed. Since caseloads
fell rapidly in all states,this gave states money to use
for work programs.) The result was that most states
embraced the opportunity to create their own wel-
fare programs. Many state governors and legislators
(and often county and city officials as well) became
quite invested in designing new systems. The result-
ing sense of ownership over these newly-reformed
welfare programs was almost surely important in
their effective implementation. In contrast, a more
centralized one-size-fits-all mandate to run particu-
lar types of work reforms could have hit significant
administrative resistance at the state and local level,
and would have been implemented much less quick-
ly and effectively.
With 50 different state welfare programs, the level
and type of support received by single mothers on
welfare or leaving welfare varies enormously across
the country.For the US,where historical suspicion of
centralized social programs is long-standing and
where national commitment to equity is weaker,this
devolution of program responsibility to the state
level worked well. In other nations, greater central-
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ization might be more effective although I suspect
that any effective job placement and assistance pro-
gram must have some local ownership and flexibility
embedded in it.
Finally, I want to underscore the importance of being
clear about the goals of welfare-related policy chang-
es.In the US,reforms focused on getting welfare recip-
ients into work, with little attention to poverty reduc-
tion. The public debate revolved around the value of
work in the lives of adults and the value of working
adults as role models for children. In contrast, the re-
cent British reforms have focused on a goal of reduc-
ing child poverty. It is perhaps not surprising that the
US reforms had more mandatory work policies (often
with punitive aspects), while the British reforms have
more incentive programs that provide income sub-
sidies to low-income families.
Low-wage and less-skilled workers, particularly sin-
gle parents, often face inherent difficulties in stabi-
lizing their economic lives. Jobs may turn over; earn-
ings may not be enough to cover family needs; fami-
ly demands may lead to more frequent job leaving.
In this environment,welfare to work programs make
sense only if one believes that engagement in the
mainstream economy has value, even beyond its
immediate economic returns, helping provide
women with a sense of contribution, and even of
identity. And one needs to believe that for at least
some of these women, initial low-wage jobs will lead
to growing income over time that provides more
economic stability.
Within the US there is a strong belief in the value of
work in peoples’ lives. There is also evidence sug-
gesting that the average less-skilled worker who is
able to keep and hold a job does experience wage
and income growth. But some subset of low-wage
workers – and particularly single mothers with small
children – have difficulty holding a stable job and are
not able to escape poverty through work alone.
Hence, on-going attention to subsidies for low-wage
work is important to these families.
Over the past 15 years, US welfare policies have be-
come much more focused on supporting low-wage
work than on providing financial support outside of
work. Furthermore, the US experience suggests that
a relatively high share of less-skilled single mothers
are able to find and hold jobs, when such jobs are
available and when they have the incentives to do so.
While some women were able to leave welfare and
escape poverty, the share of those who are both
working and poor has risen in the US.This is proba-
bly exactly what a work-based welfare system should
expect to accomplish. Other countries may be less
committed to the value of work, however. And the
economic structure of other countries may make
wage growth and job advancement in the low-wage
labor market more difficult. In these situations, the
value of welfare-to-work programs may be lower.
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